Arthur 0. Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, A Utah Corporation : Appellant\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969
Arthur 0. Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher &
Associates, A Utah Corporation : Appellant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Stephen B. Nebeker and Ronald C. Barker; Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation




~ ARTHUR O. NAUMAN, 
PWntifl - R611"61M~ 
vs. 
.·: HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
: ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
:MNEY & NELSON, DONN JI. 
GENE H. DA VIS, FORD G. 'UUllllWoll 
4 Kearns Building 
t Lake City, Utah 
.·Attorneys for P"'1iMM/f M4 
Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE ______ 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------··------------ 2 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAIL-
ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ---------- 12 
POINT II. THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBU-
TORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW -------------------··------------------------------------- 22 
POINT III. PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
IS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -------- 25 
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT -------··- 34 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases: 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986, (1954) __ 21 
Bayne v. Everham, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich. 1917) ---- 13 
Benson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790 (1955) -------------------· 24 
Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 
P.2d 616 (1963) ------------------------------------------------------------ 26 
Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 (1934) ________ 17, 21 
Covil v. Robert & Co. Assoc., 144 S.E. 2d 450 (Ga. App. 
1965) ----------------------------···-······--··--·---···-······-···-·-····-·----··- 15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663 
( 1967) --·------- -- -------- ----- ------- -----·---- -----------------·-------··------- 18 
Dresser v. New Hampshire Structural Steel Co., 4 
N.E. 2d 1012 (Mass. 1936) ------------------------------------------ 32 
Frank v. McCarthy, 112 Utah 422, 118 P.2d 737 (1948) __ 23 
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 
31 ( 1968) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 
Maddox v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 F.2d 51 
(5th Cir. 1958) --------------- ---------------------------------------------- 31 
Miami Roofing and Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48 So. 
2d 840 (Florida 1950) -------------------------------------------------- 32 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 
Pac. 940 ( 1929) ------------------------------------------------------------ 29 
Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934 (Cal. App. 
1953) --------------------------------------------------------------------------14, 15 
Turnage v. Northern Virginia Steel Corp., 336 F.2d 
837 (4th Cir. 1954) ------------------------------------------------------ 33 
Statutes: 
Rule 41 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure------------------------ 13 
35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ____________________________ 25, 27 
35-1-42 Utah Code Annotated (1953) -------------------------------- 26 
Texts: 
55 Cal. L.R. 1361, 1364 (1967) ---·---------------------------------------- 16 
5 Am. J ur. 2d Architects § 9, pp. 670-671. ------------------------ 13 
9 Utah L.R. 939 (1965) -------------------------------------------------------- 33 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 




STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
corporation, 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries resulting from a 
partial sloughing-off of a sidewall of an excavation at the 
construction site of the Public Safety and Jail Building 
(now called the Metropolitan Hall of Justice) in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before Judge Stewart M. Hanson, 
sitting without a jury. The court granted judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff Arthur 0. Nauman and against the 
defendant Harold K. Beecher and Associat.es, and awarded 
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damages in the amount of $638,135.99 plus interest and 
costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts are viewed as they 
must be on appeal, favorable to the finding of the court. It 
also contains undisputed facts which favor the defendant. 
Defendant entered into an agreement with Salt Lake 
City Corporation on March 1, 1960, by which it agreed to 
perform architectural services for a Public Safety and Jail 
Building to be erected by Salt Lake City Corporation and 
Salt Lake County (Ex. P-1) ( R-530) . 
Pertinent portions of that agreement provided as 
follows: 
"l. THE ARCHITECT'S SERVICES. The Archi-
tect's professional services consist of the necessary con-
ferences, the preparation of schematic and preliminary 
studies, working drawings, specifications, large scale 
and full size detail drawings for architectural, struc-
tural, plumbing, heating, electrical, and other mechani-
cal work;* * * " 
"7. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION. The Archi-
tect shall furnish at his expense a qualified on-site 
inspector, acceptable to both Owner and Architect, 
during the entire time the construction work is in prog-
ress, whose duties shall consist of checking all shop 
drawings, for approval of the City Engineer, to deter-
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mine the quality and acceptance of the material and/or 
equipment prop08ed to be used in the facilities being 
constructed; to supervise and inspect all phases of the 
work being done. (Emphasis Added) 
"13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will 
represent the Owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with 
respect to this agreement, and the Architect shall per-
t orm and conduct all required services under h'is direc-
tion and supervision and shall submit his reports of 
study, drawings, design, details, specifications and 
recommendations to him for City approval, as well as 
all shop drawings, change orders, estimates for pay-
ment to Contractor, as required. (Emphasis Added) 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement dated March 
1, 1960, defendant prepared Specifications (Ex. P-2). The 
Specifications contained the general contract between Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County and Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc. the general contractor. The defendant was not a party 
to that contract. 
Pertinent portions of that contract provided as follows: 
"12a. If, in the judgment of the Architect and/or 
the City Engineer or County Engineer, it is necessary 
to close down the work due to inclement weather or due 
to other circumstances arising during the progress of 
the work, that may be construed to be dangerous OT that 
may be caused by non-compliance with the specifica-
tions, the Contractor shall comply and he shall stop all 
operations upon written notice from the Architect and/ 
OT City Engineer or County Engineer so to do, and the 
work shall remain closed down until further orders 
in writing are given by said Architect and/OT City 
Engineer or County Engineer to the Contractor to pro-
ceed with the work of th'is project, and there shall be 
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no claim against either Salt Lake City Corporation or 
Salt Lake County, or the Architect or Engineers, for 
such action." (Emphasis Added) 
"19. In all operations in connection with the work 
embraced in this contract, the Contractor will be held 
responsible for any failure to respect, adhere to and 
comply with all local ordinances and laws controlling 
or limiting in any way the actions of those engaged 
upon the work, or affecting the materials or the trans-
portation disposition of them. He shall also comply with 
all Federal and State laws that in any manner affect 
his operations under this contract. * * *" (Emphasis 
Added) 
The "special conditions" of the Specifications contained 
the following pertinent provisions : 
"lb. The Contractor shall take all necessary pre-
cautions for the safety of the public and employees on 
the work and shall comply with all applicable provisions 
of Federal, State and Municipal Safety Laws and Build-
ing Codes to prevent accidents or injury to persons on, 
about, or adjacent to the premises where the work is 
being performed. He shall erect and properly maintain 
at all times, as required by the conditions and progress 
of the work, all necessary safeguards for the protection 
of the public and workmen and shall post danger signs 
warning against hazardous conditions." (Emphasis 
Added) 
"l 7a. Shoring: Contractor shall provide and be 
responsible for all temporary shoring required for 
executing and protecting the work." (Emphasis Added) 
The Metropolitan Hall of Justice complex covered ap-
proximately 11 acres of construction work (R-961). (See 
Defendant's exhibits D-41, D-42, D-43, D-44, and D-45 show-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
ing construction work). Included in the construction of the 
complex was an east-west utility tunnel. The tunnel extends 
from the Hall of Justice Building complex across Second 
East to the old City and County Building. The tunnel is 
approximately 900 feet long and is used to furnish heat 
from the new boiler room to the old building (R-771). The 
defendant drew plans and specifications for the construction 
of the utility tunnel (R-523). The plans did show the size 
of the tunnel, the materials, and the elevations of the 
tunnel in relationship to the exterior grades (R-952). The 
p'lans did not show in any way how the excavation for the 
tunnel was to be constructed (R-952). The methods and 
means of construction are strictly the responsibility of the 
general contractor (R-773). The general contractor com-
menced excavation for the utility tunnel across Second East 
westward toward the City and County Building during the 
latter part of July or first part of August, 1963 (R-773). 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement dated March 
l, 1960, between defendant and Salt Lake City, Jonathan H. 
Tucker was employed by defendant as an on-site inspector 
for the entire 11 acre project (R-523). Harry But.cher 
was the Project Engineer representing the City and the 
County on the construction project (R-954). The defendant 
and its inspector reported to the City Engineer and made no 
changes or revisions without their direct approval (R-954). 
Tucker noticed certain problems during the construe.. 
tion of the utility tunnel across Second East (R-964). He 
reported to defendant that the shoring was not proper and 
that the men were not observing safety regulations such 
as safety hats (R-964). The defendant told Tucker to call 
the State Industrial Commission and report the matter to 
them (R-964). As a result of the call to the Industrial 
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Commission, John Holmes, Safety Inspector for the Indus-
trial Commission, came to the construction site on September 
16, 1963, to inspect the excavation for the utility tunnel 
(R-612). Holmes observed the walls of the excavation were 
unsupported, the walk over the trench was unguarded, and 
men were working at the bottom without hard hats (R-612). 
These conditions were observed in the proximity of the 
west sidewalk along Second East (R-613). Holmes talked 
to the foremen for Christiansen Brothers Construction 
Company and Culp Construction Company (Culp con-
structed a portion of the utility tunnel on the east side of 
Second East) and ordered them to begin shoring the 
ground and "live up to state regulations" (R-613). Holmes 
saw some shoring started, but it was not completed (R-614). 
On September 17, 1963, Holmes reinspected the same 
working area and found his orders were being followed by 
the construction companies (R-616) (Ex. D-24). 
On September 18, 1963, Holmes inspected the project 
again and found a sub-contractor pouring hot tar in the 
excavation (R-617). Holmes stopped the work to make 
the men conform to the safety orders (R-618). Regarding 
his inspection trip on September 18, 1963, Holmes stated 
in his memorandum: 
"Other phases of the project at this time appeared 
to be carried out in a safe manner." (Ex. D-24). 
(Emphasis Added) 
On this inspection, Holmes observed the men doing some 
work on the shoring on the east side of the walk (R-618). 
That shoring appeared to be proper as he observed it (R-
618). 
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"Q. (Nebeker) And that shoring appeared to be 
proper as you observed it? 
A. (Holmes) Yes. They had 2 x 12 uprights and 
4 x 6 crosspieces at the time, which I thought was 
ample." 
The shoring in the excavation near the area where the 
slough-off occurred is the same shoring approved by Holmes 
on Sept. 18th. 
On Sept.ember 18, 1963, Commissioner Casper A. Nelson 
of the Industrial Commission sent a Jett.er to Christiansen 
Bros. Inc. (Ex. P-23) stating that Holmes had inspected 
the project on Sept.ember 16, 1963, and submitted the fol-
lowing recommendations : 
"l. Proper sloping or shoring must be maintained 
in all trench work, and ladders must be provided as 
escapeways. 
2. All elevated walkways must be guarded to con-
form with Stat.e safety rules. 
3. All employees doing work in trenches must 
wear protective headgear. 
Holmes visited the project for the fourth time on Octo-
ber 4, 1963 (R-619). Holmes' memorandum (Ex. D-24) 
contains the following entry: 
"On Oct. 4, 1963, I visit.ed the project and ordered 
Culp Construction Company to install guardrailing in 
open sections of the library building. The trench in 
the Christiansen Construction area was being filled 
at this time. No w<>rk was being performed in the 
west end of the trench." (Emphasis Added) 
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Sometime in the latter part of September, Beecher had 
a conversation with Wally Christiansen (vice president of 
Christiansen Brothers and Project Manager of the Metro-
politan Hall of Justice) to discuss the foreman who was in 
charge of the utility tunnel phase of the project (R-967). 
Due to the apparent inexperience of the foreman and 
the fact that good construction practices were not being 
observed, Beecher told Christiansen, "We have got to get 
a new foreman for this work." (Tr.-447). At that time, the 
utility tunnel was partially shored and excavated as shown 
in Exhibit P-3 & P-4 and Exhibit D-32 & D-33 (enlarge-
ments of P-3 and P-4). 
Christiansen agreed to stop the work on the utility 
tunnel until he could obtain a competent safe foreman (R-
969) (R-787). 
About two weeks later, Christiansen notified Beecher 
he had located a competent safe foreman and was planning 
to bring him down to take charge of the utility tunnel (R-
971). The plaintiff, Arthur 0. Nauman, was the foreman 
selected by Christiansen to take charge of the tunnel and 
excavation (R-971). 
During the two week period while the work in the 
excavation was stopped, Christiansen Brothers back-filled 
the excavation to a point approximately 100 feet west of 
Second East (R-789). 
On October 10, 1963, the daily reports show there was 
equipment working to load the dirt on the side of the excava-
tion in trucks so it could be hauled away (R-791). Once the 
dirt was removed, Evan Ashby, the operator of the drag 
line, began cleaning out the excavation and sloping the 
banks so when Nauman came on the job they could start 
work on the tunnel again (R-791). 
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Nauman first came on the job October 16, 1963 (R-
651). 
Christiansen told Nauman there was a light pole on 
the side of the excavation which the city would not allow to 
be removed (R-654). Christiansen further said they could 
not "taper" any more in that are.a, and Nauman would have 
to rely on the shoring in that area or additional shoring if 
he needed it (R-654). 
Nauman and Christiansen went into the tunnel to 
examine the material there and Nauman was instructed as 
to what the materials were and how to use them (R-657). 
Ashby, the drag line operator, was told to take directions 
from Nauman (R-685). Nauman was authorized to put 
in whatever shoring he felt was appropriate (R-687). 
Nauman testified as he understood the conditions, he 
considered it safe for the work they were doing (R-690). 
"Q. (Barker) Did you consider the conditions as 
they then existed to be safe for what you were doing? 
A. (Nauman) As I understood the conditions at 
the time, I considered it safe for the work we were 
doing in regards to leveling the gravel, pumping the 
water, taking the higher portions of soil out of the 
excavation with the gravel fill." (R-690). (Emphasis 
Added) 
Nau man further testified he looked at the walls of the 
excavation for safety purposes and considered them safe 
for the type of work they were doing (R-696). 
"Q. (Barker) Did you look the walls over for 
safety purposes on the 16th and 17th, the walls of the 
excavation? 
A. (Nauman) Briefly, to my satisfaction, yes. 
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Q. (Barker) And did you consider those walls in 
such manner that it was safe to send workmen into 
the excavation? 
A. (Nauman) Yes, for the type of work we were 
doing." 
On the morning of October 17, 1963, Nauman went into 
the excavation with a surveyor's level to make some grade 
shots for the laborers who were doing some fine grading 
in the bottom of the excavation (R-663). Nauman was 
standing about eight feet from the end of the existing tunnel 
on a slab of concrete which extended from the floor of the 
existing tunnel when the slough-off occurred (R-664). The 
slough-off occurred in the transition area between the shor-
ing and the sloping (Ex. P-13). 
The dirt which sloughed off from the south side of the 
excavation hit a plywood panel which extended from the 
end of the south side of the completed tunnel (P-13). The 
force of dirt knocked the panel against Nauman and he 
was knocked down ( R-664) . Jonathan Tucker thought 
Nauman was knocked over into the "rebars" (reinforcing 
steel rods) on the north side of the utility tunnel and hit 
his head on one of the rebars (second Tucker deposition 
taken in Oakland, California on October 8, 1968, p. 64). 
At the trial before Judge Hanson, defendant called 
three architects besides Beecher, who testified that the 
excavation appeared safe. 
Joe Ruben, a licensed architect since 1963, was an 
employee of defendant at the time of the accident. He testi-
fied that he took the photographs P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, and P-7 
(R-198). The photographs dated October 2, 1963, and Oc-
tober 16, 1963, were enlarged and photographic projections 
were made on the enlargements. Ruben testified that where 
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there is a known distance in a photograph, other distances 
in the same plane can be determined ( R-721) . In the enlarged 
photograph dated October 16, 1963, (D-31) the known 
dimension is the width of the tunnel-8 feet 8 inches (R-
732). By means of the photographic projection, Ruben 
determined that the depth of the excavation was 21' 11"; 
that the width of the excavation at the bottom was 15' and 
the width at the top was 37' (R-722). He further testified 
that the south bank of the excavation had been sloped out 
a distance of 11' (R-723). This sloping met the full re-
quirements of the Industrial Commission : one foot of slope 
for every two feet of depth. Here, the excavation was about 
22 feet deep and the walls had been sloped back eleven 
feet on both sides of the excavation (R-725). 
Ruben testified that photographic projections are 
accurate and represent a true and faithful representation 
of what actually existed (R-726). 
Ruben further testified he considered the excavation 
safe to go into on October 16, 1963-the day he took the 
photograph. (R-751). 
Fred Montmorency, a licensed architect since 1960, 
testified that the "American Institute of Architects Hand-
book of Professional Practice," September, 1963 Edition, 
states that the architect is responsible for seeing that the 
contract is properly performed and guards the owner 
against defects and deficiencies in the work (R-834). 
Montmorency further stated that under American 
Institute of Architect's Document A201, the contractor was 
to take all necessary precautions for the safety of employees 
on the work (R-837). 
Montmorency further testified that he had examined 
all of the documents and photographs relating to the 
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excavation and in his opinion Beecher acted in a reasonable 
and prudent manner with respect to the safety of this 
particular phase of the project (R-825). He said the ex-
cavation appeared safe (R-844). 
Ralph Edwards, a licensed architect since 1954, testi-
fied that he had also reviewed all documents and photo-
graphs relating to the excavation (R-904). He testified 
that in his opinion the excavation appeared safe and he 
would not have stopped the work (R-911). He further 
stated that if a representative from the Industrial Com-
mission had come down and inspected the job and did not 
issue an order stating that the job should be closed down, 
then he would assume the job was to continue (R-916). 
Beecher, a licensed architect since 1940 testified that in 
his opinion the excavation appeared safe on October 17, 
1963, and he would not have shut it down (R-986). 
The plaintiff did not offer in evidence any testimony 
from an architect that in his opinion the excavation was 
dangerous at the time of the accident and the work should 
have been stopped. This is true even though the plaintiff's 
attorneys had an architect in the courtroom during a sub-
stantial part of the trial ( R-1109) . 
On the basis of thls evidence, the court sitting without 
a jury entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant and awarded damages in the amount 
of $638,135.99. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case defendant 
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moved the court for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 
41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-712). At the 
conclusion of all the evidence, defendant renewed its motion 
(R-1062). Defendant contends the plaintiff failed to produce 
any competent evidence from which the finder of fact 
could conclude that the defendant was negligent and that 
defendant was entitled to a direcled verdict. 
The courts and text writers have unanimously held 
that the duty of an architect is the same as the duty owing 
by a lawyer or doctor. 
"An architect, in contracting for his services as 
such, implies that he possesses skill and ability, in-
cluding taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the 
required services at least ordinarily and reasonably 
well, and that he will exercise and apply in the given 
case his skill, ability, judgment and taste reasonably 
and without neglect. The duty owing to his employer 
is essentially the same as that which is owed by any 
person to another where such person holds himself 
out as possessing skill and ability in some special 
employment and offers his services to the public on 
account of his fitness to act in the line of business for 
which he may be employed. An architect holds him-
self out as an expert in his particular line of work and 
is employed because he is believed to be such." 5 Am Jur 
2d Architects § 9 pp 670-671. 
In Bayne v. Everham, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich. 
1917), the Court held: 
" ... [T]he responsibility of an architect does not 
differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When he 
possesses the requisite skill and knowledge, and in the 
exercise thereof has used his best judgment, he has 
done all the law requires. The architect is not a warran-
tor of his plans and specifications. The result may show 
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a mistake or defect, although he may have exercised the 
reasonable skill required." 
In Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934 (Cal. App. 
1953), a workman fell through the roof of a building when 
the sheathing gave way. He sued the architect and alleged 
negligence in the preparation of the plans and specifications 
for the building. The appellate court approved the following 
instruction which clearly and correctly states the prevail-
ing law as to the standard of care owed to third parties 
by an architect : 
"By undertaking professional service to a client, an 
architect impliedly represents that he possesses, and 
it is his duty to possess, that degree of learning and 
skill ordinarily possessed by architects of good stand-
ing, practicing in the same locality. It is his further 
duty to use the care ordinarily exercised in like cases 
by reputable members of his profession practicing in 
the same locality; to use reasonable diligence and his 
best judgment in the exercise of his skill and the appli-
cation of his learning, in an effort to accomplish the 
purpose for which he is employed. . . In determining 
whether the defendants architects' learning, skill and 
conduct fulfilled the duties imposed by law, as they 
have been stated to you, you are not permitted to set 
up arbitrarily a standard of your own. The standard 
is that set by the learning, skill and care ordinarily 
possessed and practiced by others of the same pro-
fession in the same locality, at the same time." (Em-
phasis Added) 
Ordinarily, expert opinion is necessary to establish 
the standard of care practiced by professional men and 
whether or not there has been a breach of that standard. 
In Covil v. Robert & Co. Assoc., 144 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. 
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App. 1965), a Georgia court compared the architect with 
other professional men and held that the care required of an 
architect is properly the subject of expert opinion: 
"By analogy with other cases in which recovery has 
been sought against persons for their negligence in 
performing skilled services, it was necessary here that 
plaintiffs establish the standard of care applicable to 
defendant by the introduction of expert opinion evi-
dence. (citations omitted) If this standard was not 
established by the necessary proof, the trial court was 
justified in the grant of nonsuit." 
In Paxton v. Alameda County, supra, the court con-
sidered the question of expert testimony and held there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the architect 
was negligent in the preparation of plans and specifications. 
Three experts, in addition to the defendant, testified the 
plans and specifications were prepared according to the 
accepted standard and practice in Alameda County. The 
plaintiff produced one architect (Rosebrook) who testified 
to the contrary. He testified that the specifications used 
did not conform to the customary practice in the community. 
The Appellate Court concluded that Rosebrook's testimony 
was too insubstantial and incomplete to support a finding of 
negligence. The court noted: 
"That opinion (of Rosebrook) would seem to have 
no greater weight than if made by a carpenter un-
trained and inexperienced in computing loads and 
stresses and the relative tensile strength of various 
types and grades of lumber." Id. at 942. 
And further: 
"Mere deviation from 'customary practice' does 
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not, under the circumstances of our case, prove that 
the resulting condition was dangerous or defective." Id. 
The Appellate Court, commenting on the testimony of 
the experts, stated: 
"Thus we have a picture of an architect who care-
fully computed the loads the sheathing would be called 
upon to bear and the strength and allowable stress of 
various materials. He then specified a material which 
those computations convince him had a wide margin of 
safety between the stresses it would receive and those 
it was capable of bearing. These computations he made 
in compliance with the applicable requirements of the 
building laws and in accordance with the standards of 
good practice in his profession and his community. 
That, we think, would negative a basis for a finding of 
negligence even if he had made some mistakes in his 
computations and there is no evidence that he made any 
such mistakes, instead, the experts who did compute 
confirmed his method of computing and the results of 
his computations." (Emphasis Added) 
In 55 California Law Review appears an article entitled 
"Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and 
Specifications." The author of the article states: 
"A jury can judge the skill of an architect in 
analyzing stresses only by hearing testimony from 
other architects; it can learn about standard architect-
ural practices only by hearing architects testify as to 
those practices. As in other fields of professional 
liability, however, if a layman is as competent as an 
expert to judge whether or not a particular design 
created an unusual risk, evidence by experts is inadmis-
sible because their proof that the defendant followed 
standard practice would not necessarily show he was 
not negligent." 55 Cal. L.R. 1361, 1364 (1967) 
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In medical malpractice cases, this court has consistently 
followed the general rule that expert opinion is necessary to 
show that the physician did not exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence usually exercised by physicians practicing 
in the community. 
The cast; of Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 
(1934), involved an action for damages against a surgeon 
arising out of alleged negligence in the treatment of a leg in-
jury. The plaintiff alleged that the doctor did not use proper 
medical practices and as a consequence, plaintiff's leg had 
to be amputated to save her life. The lower court directed 
a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff offered expert 
testimony, in the form of a treatise, that the defendant had 
used a "worthless" antiseptic. In rejecting that evidence, 
the Court stated : 
"In a case such as this confusion often arises over 
a failure to distinguish between the expert's opinion as 
to the proper method of treatment and his opinion as 
to whether or not the treatment applied conforms to 
what is generally accepted to be the proper method. The 
practice of medicine or of surgery has not become so 
standardized that it is unreasonable for two doctors to 
have different opinions as to the proper method of 
treating injuries. If, then, there is reason for the 
existence of that difference, neither opinion can be 
proven erroneous by offering as proof thereof merely 
the other. It does not fall upon the shoulders of the 
judge or jury to determine whether or not there is a 
good and sufficient reason for the existence of such a 
difference; that reason is assumed to be valid when it 
appears from the evidence that the divisions of opinion 
are such that it cannot be said of any one opinion that 
it is generally accepted to be the right one." Coon at 
349. (Emphasis Added) 
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In Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663 
(1967), there was a question as to whether a physician had 
properly treated a child's finger which later had to be 
amputated. The court held that a doctor was not required 
to guarantee his treatment: 
"It will be noted that the only expert testimony in 
the case comes from Doctor Wilson, the plaintiffs' 
family physician. Doctor Wilson was of the opinion 
that there was a possibility that the finger might have 
been saved with treatment other than that employed 
by the defendant, however, he also testified that in all 
probability the finger would have required amputation 
because the bone in the finger had already been amputa.-
ted. Had the court submitted the matter to the jury on 
the case as made by the plaintiffs it would have re-
quired the jury to speculate and to base its verdict upon 
conjecture. The law does not impose upon a physician 
or surgeon the duty of guaranteeing that his treatment 
will achieve good results, but on the contrary, the law 
imposes upon him the duty to employ that care and 
skill required of men of similar calling, and under 
similar circumstances." Dickinson at 665. (Emphasis 
Added) 
Was the condition of this excavation so obviously 
dangerous that an untrained layman could recognize it? 
It is respectfully submitted that the answer to this question 
is "no" because untrained laymen working on the job 
thought it was safe. The plaintiff testified he thought the 
excavation was safe for the work they were doing (R-692). 
Ashby, the operator of the drag line, testified the excavation 
was safe for the work that was being performed (R-891). 
Wally Christiansen, the project manager for the general 
contractor, testified the excavation was "safe" (R-803). In 
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addition to the lay testimony that the excavation appeared 
safe, the defendant called four architects, including the 
defendant's president who testified the excavation appeared 
safe. Ruben, a licensed architect, testified that the south 
bank of the excavation (the bank where the slough-off oc-
curred) had been sloped back 11 feet. He testified that 
since the excavation was about 22 feet deep, the slope was 
in full compliance with the requirements of the State In-
dustrial Commisson (R-723). He further testified on 
cross-examination that he felt the excavation was safe (R-
751). Montmorency, licensed architect, testified that in his 
opinion the excavation did not constitute a dangerous con-
dition (R-831). He also testified the excavation was safe 
(R-844). Edwards, licensed architect, testified the slope of 
the excavation met the requirements of the State Industrial 
Commission (R-914). He testified that the excavation was 
in "good condition" from his visual observation of the photo-
graphs which were taken the day before the accident (R-
910). Beecher, president of the defendant architectural 
firm, testified that in looking at the excavation it appeared 
to be safe and he would not have shut down the work (R-
986). No one thought the excavation was unsafe. 
This testimony conclusively shows that the condition 
of the excavation was not so obviously dangerous that a lay-
man could easily recognize the hazard. This was a matter 
for expert testimony from an architect. This is particularly 
true when viewed in the light of the contract between the 
Joint Authority and the general contractor. That contract 
specifically provided: "If in the judgment of the archi-
tect . .. " No fact finder could conclude that the architect 
had exercised unreasonable judgment except upon the testi-
mony of other architects. The plaintiff failed to call any 
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architects as witnesses. This is true even though plaintiff 
had an architect in the courtroom during a substantial por-
tion of the trial (R-1109). 
Since the plaintiff failed to call an architect to testify 
that in his opinion the defendant had failed to exercise that 
degree of care ordinarily exercised by architects in the 
community, there was no competent evidence to submit to 
the fact finder. Defendant's motion for an involuntary 
dismissal should have been granted at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case or at the conclusion of all the evidence. 
It is assumed that plaintiff will argue that the testi-
mony of Harry F. Butcher, Project Engineer for Salt Lake 
City, John Holmes, Safety Inspector for the Industrial Com-
mission and Casper A. Nelson, former member of the Indus-
trial Commission, presented enough evidence to justify 
submitting the matter to the fact finder. None of these 
witnesses were architects. Butcher is a land surveyor, 
Holmes has no professional qualification and Nelson is a 
chemical engineer. None of these witnesses testified that 
in their opinion the defendant architect had failed to exer-
cise reasonable care. 
Holmes did not testify to the issue of whether or not 
the excavation appeared safe on the morning of the accident. 
Butcher testified that the walls of the excavation were 
straight up and down except where it had been sloped a 
little at the top (R-563). 
Butcher admitted on cross-examination that the south 
bank had been sloped back 10 feet (R-591). This amount 
of slope would be in substantial compliance with the require-
ments of the Industrial Commission. 
Nelson testified the walls of the excavation were "real 
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vertical-rather irregular as one might expect with a drag 
line excavation ... " (R-630). 
Nelson also admitted on cross-examination that the 
walls had been sloped back ten or eleven feet on both sides 
(R-639), which would be in full compliance with the re-
quirements of the Industrial Commission. 
This Court has previously held that the testimony of a 
witness on his direct examination is no stronger than as 
modified or left by cross-examination. In Alvarado v. 
Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954), this Court 
stated: 
" ... The rule is familiar that 'testimony of a witness on 
his direct examination is no stronger than as modified 
or left by his further examination or by his cross-
examination. A particular part of his testimony may 
not be singled out to the exclusion of other parts of 
equal importance bearing on the subject." 
The testimony from these witnesses clearly shows the 
excavation had been sloped properly and met the require-
ments of the Industrial Commission. Their descriptions 
of the excavation constitute nothing more than their opin-
ions. That opinion would not constitute competent evidence 
on which to find the defendant negligent. See Coon v. 
Shields, supra. 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant was entitled 
to an involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plain-
tiff's case. 
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POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The plaintiff failed to produce competent expert testi-
mony to show the defendant was negligent. If the 
excavation was so dangerous that a layman could testify 
as to his observations, then the plaintiff, a construction 
foreman, is guilty of negligence as a matter of law for 
going in the excavation and permitting workmen under 
his direction to go in when he knew or should have known 
the excavation was dangerous. 
The undisputed testimony shows the plaintiff thought 
the excavation was safe. Nauman examined the walls of the 
excavation on October 16th and 17th when he was in the 
excavation to see if they were safe (R-696). He testified he 
considered the walls safe for the type of work they were 
doing (R-696). In spite of the plaintiff's uncontradicted 
testimony that the excavation was safe, plaintiff claims 
the excavation was dangerous, and the defendant should 
have stopped the work. The plaintiff is caught on the 
horns of a dilemma. If the excavation appeared safe as he 
testified, then the defendant was not negligent in reaching 
the same conclusion. However, if the excavation was 
dangerous, it was more apparent to the plaintiff that! it 
was to the defendant and the plaintiff was negligent. The 
plaintiff was the foreman on this phase of the work. He had 
the timber to shore and the drag line and operator to 
slope. He had the authority to do anything he felt was 
necessary to make the excavation safe (R-685-687). Nau-
man had been in the construction work approximately 17 
years (R-670). He stated every job has some amount of 
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excavation (R-668). The deepest excavation he could 
recall was the excavation on the east side of the University 
Medical Center which was approximately 18 feet deep 
(R-668). The plaintiff cannot claim in one breath that 
the excavation appeared safe to him and in the next breath 
that it should have appeared dangerous to the defendant. 
The plaintiff had the primary responsibility to protect his 
own life. If the excavation was dangerous and a layman 
could so testify, the plaintiff should have observed that 
condition and refused to go in the excavation or corrected 
the situation. 
This court has previously recognized the rule that if 
reasonable minds would not be warranted in reaching any 
conclusion other than that plaintiff is guilty of contributory 
negligence in the light of his own testimony or other 
undisputed facts, there is no jury question but a question 
of law for the court. 
In Frank v. McCarthy, 112 Utah 422, 118 P.2d 737 
(1948) , a motor vehicle train collision case, plaintiffs 
obtained a jury verdict against defendant. At trial, defen-
dants moved for a directed verdict claiming plaintiffs 
were contributorily negligent for crossing the tracks while 
their view was obstructed. The lower court denied de-
fendants' motion. 
On appeal, this court reversed, holding that plaintiffs' 
contributory negligence barred their recovery. This court 
held: 
" ... if reasonable minds would not be warranted 
in reaching any conclusion other than that plaintiffs 
were guilty of contributory negligence in the light 
of plaintiffs' own testimony or other undisputed 
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facts, there is no jury question but a question of law 
for the court." Id. at 426. 
In Benson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790 (1955), plaintiff motorist 
sued defendant for injuries sustained in a train auto 
collision. A jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, de-
fendants claimed plaintiff was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law because he failed to maintain a proper 
lookout. 
This court reversed the jury verdict stating: 
"The rule to be applied in deciding whether or 
not plaintiff is to be held contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law is . . . If all reasonable minds would 
arrive at the same conclusion, that is, that Benson 
failed to use the degree of care which an ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person would have observed 
for his own safety under the circumstances, then the 
defendant's contention [of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law] is correct." Id. at 41. 
Defendant denies that its acts or omissions in any way 
contributed to the accident on October 17, 1963. However, 
plaintiff claims that the excavation was dangerous. If this 
contention is correct and the defendant should have ob-
served the condition and stopped the work, then it must 
follow that the dangerous condition was obvious to the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff knew that this portion of the work had 
been shut down because the previous foreman had not 
competently and safely directed the work and plaintiff was 
specifically directed to be careful and safe. (R-676-680) 
The plaintiff had the duty to exercise reasonable care to 
protect his own life. His failure to take reasonable pre-
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cautions for his own safety would constitute negligence 
as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
IS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
Plaintiff, an employee of Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 
is receiving his workmen's compensation benefits. He has 
filed suit against defendant alleging defendant is liable 
as a third party pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-
1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
"Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of 
third parties-Remedies of employee-Rights of 
employer or insurance carrier in cause of action-
Maintenance of action-Disbursement of proceeds of 
recovery.- When any injury or death for which 
compensation is payable under this title shall have 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
person not in the same employment, the injured em-
ployee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also have an action for 
damages against such third person ... " (Emphasis 
Added) 
Defendant contends that plaintiff's action is barred as 
a matter of law under the provisions of Section 35-1-62, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, because plaintiff and defendant 
were in the same employment. 
The contract between the defendant and Salt Lake 
City Corporation required the defendant "to supervise and 
inspect all phases of the work being done." (Ex. P-8) 
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The contract entered into between the Joint Authority 
and Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the general contractor, 
provided that if in the judgment of the architect it was 
necessary to close down the work due to "other circum-
stances arising during the progress of the work, that may 
be construed to be dangerous," then the contractor was to 
comply and stop all operations upon written notice of the 
architect. 
If this right and corresponding duty did exist, which 
defendant denies, defendant clearly had the right to super-
vise and control the plaintiff. The right to supervise and 
control is the basic element in determining when there is 
an employment situation. Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, expressly states that where an employer retains 
supervision and control over a contractor, that contractor 
and all persons employed by him and all subcontractors 
under him are considered in the same employment. Where 
the employees of one contractor had the right to supervise 
and direct the employees of another, this court has held 
that a suit by an injured employee of one contractor against 
the other contractor, working on the same project, was 
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
In Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 
P.2d 616 (1963), the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
injuries suffered while working on a diversion tunnel at 
the Flaming Gorge Dam. 
The plaintiff was employed by Coker Construction Co. 
Kiewit had a contract with Coker to construct the tunnel 
and to share profits and losses in the enterprise. The plain-
tiff's job was to drill holes in the rock in which charges 
of dynamite were placed. The plaintiff testified in his 
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deposition that he was directed where to drill by Kiewit 
engineers. The plaintiff contended that one of Kiewit's 
employees had negligently placed a charge of dynamite 
in such a position that Kiewit should have foreseen that 
plaintiff would strike it when drilling holes within the 
scope of his employment with Coker. 
The defendant moved for summary judgment based 
upon the affidavits, depositions and pleadings in the case. 
The defendant contended that the plaintiff was in its employ 
and that the plaintiff was barred by the exclusive remedy 
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The de-
fendant appealed the denial of its motion for summary 
judgment. 
This court held that the employees of Coker were 
employees of the defendant, Peter Kiewit & Sons, and that 
the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. 
In interpreting the language of Section 35-1-62, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, supra, this court stated: 
"The language of the statute preserving an action 
against ' . . . third persons' who are 'not in the same 
employment ... ' seems plainly designed to apply to 
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers 
jointly engaged in the same endeavor." 
This court further stated : 
"In approaching the question here presented it 
is well to keep in mind that the philosophy behind the 
Workmen's Compensation Act encompasses two main 
objectives. The first is to assure that an employee who 
is injured in employment will have necessary medical 
and hospital care and modest but certain compensation 
for his injury, with resulting benefits to himself, his 
family and to society generally; the other is to afford 
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employers a measure of protection against exorbitant 
claims for injuries. 
In regard to the protection of employees, if cir-
cumstances were such that it was necessary to classify 
the plaintiff as an employee of defendant Kiewit 
Construction Company to qualify for workmen's 
compensation, undoubtedly there would have been ef-
forts to so classify him. This is not without justification. 
This court has frequently stated that the Act should 
be liberally construed and applied to afford coverage 
to the employee and give effect to the purposes of the 
act. This rule of liberality in finding coverage for the 
employee is sound and is applicable here, even though 
the plaintiff, having already obtained his award, now 
attempts to go contrary to this policy and 'paddle for 
the other shore' in contending that he would not be 
covered by workmen's compensation as an employee 
of Kiewit." (Emphasis Added) 
Although this court held the defendant and plaintiff's 
employer were joint venturers, that was not the sole basis 
for the holding. The dissenting opinion noted that the 
majority opinion placed little reliance on the technical 
requisites of a joint venture. 
The real basis of the decision was that there was an 
overlap of supervision by the defendant and the plaintiff's 
employer. The court noted: 
"The plaintiff testified that he worked with them 
fairly closely and that he was directed where to drill 
by Kiewit engineers." 
Thus, the decision rested on the fact that the defendant 
and the plaintiff's employer were both engaged in the same 
endeavor and exercised supervisory functions over each 
other's employees. The test is whether or not the employers 
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are engaged in the same project and whether there is an 
overlap of supervision. 
In Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 
Pac. 940 (1929) this court held the Workmen's Compensation 
Act barred a third party suit against the defendant con-
tractor where the injured man, an employee of Denver & Rio 
Grande Railroad Co., was engaged in work for which the 
defendant was responsible. 
The defendant had entered into a contract with the 
State of Utah for the construction of a highway parallel 
to a Denver & Rio Grande Railroad track. The plaintiff 
Murray was an employee of the railroad company. 
Murray was designated by a railroad official to keep the 
track clear of debris, to warn the defendant of oncoming 
trains and the trainmen of possible obstruction on the 
tracks. 
The plaintiff was paid his salary by the railroad com-
pany but the railroad was reimbursed by the defendant for 
the plaintiff's services. 
Plaintiff was injured by the alleged negligence of 
defendant's employees. This court held plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant and workmen's compensation 
was his exclusive remedy, even though the defendant did not 
list plaintiff as an employee with the State Industrial 
Commission. 
This court said that regardless of the manner of the 
plaintiff's selection or who paid his wages or had power to 
discharge him or the possibility that the railroad company 
might remain his general employer, he was an employee of 
the defendant while engaged in work for which the de-
fendant was responsible. 
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This court held : 
"We are of the opinion that under the facts in 
this case the relation of employee and employer as 
defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act existed as 
a matter of law between the plaintiff and defendant. 
In such case the exclusive remedy of the plaintiff is 
to proceed under such act ... " (Emphasis Added) 
If the defendant Beecher had the duty to supervise and 
inspect the work, it shared the responsibility for the work 
being performed by the plaintiff. Beecher's duty to super-
vise and inspect and to bear responsibility for compliance 
with the drawings and specifications places Beecher and 
Nauman "in the same employment." 
In Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 
31 (1968), this court held that the plaintiff and defendant 
were working for the same employer at the time when the 
defendant injured the plaintiff so plaintiff's action was 
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
In that case the defendant owned a dump truck and 
orally agreed to furnish it, including a driver to Gibbons 
and Reed Company at a price of ten dollars per hour while 
in use. Gibbons and Reed did not list the defendant, the 
actual driver of the truck, on their payroll and made no 
deductions from the truck rental, for social security, income 
taxes, and dues. Gibbons and Reed had a contract to 
lower the grade of a street in Ogden City. After the street 
had been excavated to the new grade, the dirt was loaded into 
dump trucks and hauled to a destination determined by 
Gibbons and Reed. The plaintiff was an employee of Gib-
bons and Reed Company. 
The defendant had to maintain his position in a line 
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of trucks which were similarly engaged in hauling dirt for 
Gibbons and Reed. Defendant was told when to increase 
the speed of his truck, when to back up, when to drive 
away, and he could not haul dirt in any other manner than 
he was told. 
Defendant, while backing his truck into position, 
backed over the plaintiff, causing personal injuries. This 
court held the plaintiff and defendant were employees of 
Gibbons and Reed and the plaintiff's exclusive remedy 
was workmen's compensation. 
The basis of the decision was the control of Gibbons 
and Reed over the defendant which made him a co-employee 
with the plaintiff. 
Applying the rationale of the Utah cases to the instant 
case, it appears that Beecher and Nauman were "in the 
same employment." Beecher and Nauman were co-workers 
jointly engaged in the same endeavor. Beecher, as the 
architect, had the duty to supervise and inspect all phases 
of the work being done. In the execution of this duty, it 
exercised control over Nauman's work. Under Utah law, it 
is immaterial that Beecher did not hire Nauman or pay 
his workmen's compensation premium. 
Beecher and Christiansen Brothers both had contracts 
with the Joint Authority. Their relationship is similar to 
that of two subcontractors working for the same principal. 
In Maddox v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 F.2d 51 
(5th Cir. 1958), a suit very similar to the instant case, the 
city was engaged in expanding its facilities for furnishing 
water to its inhabitants and contracted with Black and 
Beatch, consulting engineers, to prepare plans for the 
work and to supervise its execution. The city contracted 
the Petyak-Y oung Construction Co. to perform the work. 
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Plaintiffs' intestate, Maddox, was an employee of the 
construction company. As the work progressed, the engi-
neers sent an employee to inspect the work. The engineer's 
employee was accompanied by the deceased to assist in the 
inspection. 
While in one of the water mains, the engineer's 
employee negligently lit a match which caused an explosion, 
killing the construction company's employee. 
The trial court dismissed an action filed by the heirs 
of Maddox as a matter of law on the ground that the engi-
neers and the contractor were in the same employment and 
thus the action was barred by the exclusive remedy pro-
visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The basis of the decision was a statute, similar to that 
in Utah, which made the original employer liable for Work-
men's Compensation coverage of the employees of any 
contractor. 
Similarly, the joint authority in the instant case, being 
responsible for the workmen's compensation coverage 
with all of its contractors under the above-quoted statute, 
places Beecher and Nauman in the same employment. 
Other courts have held suits of employees of one sub-
contractor against the other contractor were barred by the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
See Miami Roofing and Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48 
So.2d 840 (Florida, 1950) (suit by employee of one contrac-
tor against another subcontractor on same project, held: 
Action barred by Workmen's Compensation Act); Dresser 
v. New Hampshire Structural Steel Co., 4 N.E.2d 1012 
(Mass. 1936), (action by employee of one subcontractor 
against another subcontractor on same project, held: Action 
barred under Workman's Compensation Law; Turnage v. 
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Northern Virginia Steel Corp., 336 F.2d 837 (4th Cir., 
1964) (suit by employee of subcontractor against general 
contractor on same project held: Action barred by the 
Workman's Compensation Law). 
Some of the courts which have held the Workmen's 
Compensation Act barred third party suits have done so on 
the grounds the party being sued was liable for payment 
of the workmen's compensation insurance premium. The 
theory behind this line of cases is that the contractor in-
cludes the amount of the workmen's compensation premium 
in the bid to the owner or general contractor. 
Although the defendant did not pay the insurance 
premiums for Nauman, this court has not required payment 
of the compensation premium as a prerequisite in determin-
ing whether the contractor had tort immunity under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
In 9 Utah L. Rev. 939, (1965) appears an excellent note 
entitled "Third-Party Liability Under Workmen's Com-
pensation Law". At page 957 the author states: 
" ... Having responsibility for compensation insurance 
premiums,· however, does not seem to be an indispen-
sable factor under Utah cases in determining whether 
a contractor has tort immunity. In Cook, (supra) the 
defendant-employer who received immunity was not 
responsible for workmen's compensation insurance on 
the injured employee. In Murray (supra), an employer 
was given exemption from tort liability on the basis that 
an employee could have two employers, and that the 
defendant had paid no compensation premiums on the 
injured workman or even listed him as an employee 
was inconsequential. In Burke (75 Utah 441, 286 Pac. 
623 ( 1930), immunity was purchased by the principal's 
paying the premiums directly under an agreement wit~ 
· the contractor when he had no statutory obligation to 
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do so ... The Utah decisions suggest that the court 
looks to the facts of each case and then makes a de-
termination on an ad hoc basis of whether two contrac-
tors are 'in the same employment.' Furthermore, the 
Utah Supreme Court recognizes the compromise 
character of the act as it has been designed by the 
legislature and attempts to guard the rights of employ-
ers as zealously as it guards the rights of employ-
ees ... " 
As indicated in the Cook case, supra, "the language of 
the statute preserving an action against' ... third persons' 
who are 'not in the same employment ... ' " seems plainly 
designed to apply to strangers to the employment and not 
to co-workers jointly engaged in the same endeavor. 
The purpose of the act is to give employees certain 
compensation and to afford employers protection against 
exorbitant claims for injuries. The act should also protect 
subcontractors working on the same project. 
This court has interpreted the language "in the same 
employment" broadly to protect employees and also to 
protect employers. On this basis it is respectfully submitted 
that Beecher is within the scope of protection afforded by 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and the action is 
barred. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
In paragraphs 16 and 18 of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law the court found that the "trench in 
the area where the cavein occurred was dangerous and 
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unsafe * * * and did not comply with the General Safety 
Orders of the Utah State Industrial Commission regarding 
sloping and shoring * * * " (R-464). 
The court further found that the "architect knew or 
should have known that the trench was unsafe * * * " 
(R-464). 
As a result of these findings the court concluded the 
defendant was negligent for failing to stop the work 
(R-465). 
The evidence does not support these findings for all 
the witnesses testified the excavation appeared safe or they 
admitted the walls had been properly sloped. (See Point I 
wherein the testimony of the various witnesses is reviewed.) 
The shoring over the partially completed tunnel did not 
fail (Ex. 13). Both the north and the south bank of the 
excavation west of the existing tunnel had been properly 
sloped (D-30, D-31, R-722, 723). 
The undisputed testimony clearly establ'ished that the 
defendant was not negligent. It had taken every reasonable 
precaution to see that the excavation was safe. No one 
thought the excavation was dangerous at the time the 
slough-off occurred. 
The court also made a finding that the plaintiff was 
not warned of the "dangerous conditions" existing in the 
trench and "was not aware of the same due to his lack 
of prior experiences in such trenches" (R-463-464). 
On the basis of these findings the court concluded that 
the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent nor did he 
assume the risk (Paragraph 13 and 15, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, R-465). 
This finding and conclusion is contrary to the undis-
puted testimony. The evidence shows the plaintiff had been 
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in the construction industry 17 years (R-676). He had been 
a foreman for Christiansen Bros. for 4 years (R-668). 
Plaintiff knew this portion of the work had been stopped 
because the prior foreman had not competently and safely 
directed the work (R-676-680). Nauman stated every job 
has some amount of excavation (R-668). He had been on an 
excavation about 18 feet deep (R-668). Plaintiff had been 
on the job 91/2 hours and had actually examined and ob-
served the earth banks of the excavation. He considered 
the walls and the excavation safe for the work they were 
doing (R-696). 
If the excavation was dangerous as plaintiff claims, 
then he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for 
going in the excavation. (See Point II). 
The court also concluded as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff's complaint was not barred by the provisions of 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act (R-465). It is 
respectfully submitted that this conclusion is contrary to 
the law. (See Point III). 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed testimony clearly shows the defendant 
was not negligent. Defendant requested the Industrial 
Commission inspectors to examine the excavation. By 
mutual agreement between the architect and the general 
contractor, the work on the excavation was stopped for 
about two weeks while the general contractor located a 
competent foreman to handle that phase of the project. 
The plaintiff, the competent foreman chosen by Christiansen, 
was given authority to do whatever he felt was necessary 
to make the excavation safe. He stated that the excava-
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tion appeared safe for the work they were doing. The 
plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to show that de-
fendant's president was negligent in the judgment he 
exercised. In the absence of any competent testimony to 
prove negligence, the defendant is entitled to a directed 
verdict, or in the alternative, to a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHENB.NEBEKER 
and 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant. 
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